


NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

UN Legion: An Operational Tool

by



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Lieutenant Commander, US Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in the partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

Between the strategic goal of international security and stability and the tactical employment of forces to carry out UN resolutions, there currently exists a chasm. No operational tool is readily available for matching the ends to means. The operational commander in the field needs to be politician and baby sitter to fully grasp the ramifications of these resolutions, while simultaneously training and equipping the come-as-you-are forces which arrive to participate in UN peace operations. A tool to bridge the gap between strategic and tactical could be the formation of a UN Legion made up of international volunteers and supported by a well-staffed headquarters.

The United Nations Legion in Action

“Corpsman, up!!” Major Huusa, of Norway, screamed as the man beside him fell over from the impact of a sniper round. The United Nations Gabon-Congo Truce (UNGACOT) Mission, had been in country for 5 days and already the casualty list numbered at 25 men.

Major Huusa stayed with the wounded Sergeant until the medical personnel had him stabilized enough for the move to the medical tent. His injury was not life threatening, but he would probably have to be sent back home to Guinea Bissau.

At the Headquarters tent, Major Huusa burst in on the Colonel to announce the latest casualty. Colonel Ness, also of Norway, had been going over the options available to his lightly armed group of peacekeepers. He knew it was time to alert the Joint Force Commander to send in the Light Mechanized Infantry battalion floating off the coast to provide some teeth to this United Nations peace operation.

Back at the United Nations in New York City, Secretary General Tilman was already in conference with the permanent members of the Security Council; they all got the news at the same time. The wall unit was showing the CNN reporter’s face, and his voice report was heard in the background.

“This is Peter Arnot reporting from Gabon, where the Congon government continues its attempts to solve a long-standing border dispute with military force. Just moments ago, there was another United Nations Peacekeeper injured carrying out his mission. The tensions here are high, and it is only a matter of time before real bloodshed begins. The warring factions are embittered by the imposed cease-fire ; I see little stopping them from returning to hostilities.

“In other actions today, CNN has learned of a refusal by both sides to meet with Colonel Ness, the United Nations Peacekeeping force Commanding Officer. The meeting had been intended as an effort to further define the boundaries as set forth in United

Security Council Resolution 1648. A spokesman for the Gabon government said they see no reason to recognize illegal activities inside their homeland. A spokesman for the Congo government refused comment. This reporter just wonders how much longer before the real muscle behind the Legionnaires comes ashore to put this matter to rest."

Off the coast of Gabon, the 4th Light Mechanized Infantry battalion was just lifting off the deck of a French aircraft carrier. The men had been held in reserves, while their equipment was waiting ashore, having been delivered by Russian transports. The 4th battalion had been chosen because it was made up of mostly Africans; the French carrier was just completing its first of two years on loan to the United Nations Legion.

With little fan-fare, the battalion came ashore and established themselves in designated defensive positions. Colonel Lambé had 15 years with the French Paratroopers before signing up with the Legion; he knew his job. He wasted no time in relieving Colonel Ness on station and taking charge of the peace enforcement operation. He knew that time was against him. The warring factions had already had 5 days to form the wrong opinion of the military capabilities of the Legion, and he needed to set them straight ASAP.

The contingency planning group had nearly nailed this one on the head. Two years previous, a Legion Major from Congo had been on the contingency planning group and had submitted a case study for this circumstance. All Colonel Lambé and his staff had to do was train on unique country specific items, brief the contingency plan and his battalion was ready for action.

After brief but rather fierce fighting, the leaders from the Congon and Gabon governments were sitting across from one another at the negotiating table and Colonel Ness was setting up to re-relieve Colonel Lambé for a return to peacekeeping.

Another UN Legion mission had been accomplished.

The United Nations Legion is born

The above scenario is set in the year 2020. In this imaginary scenario, the United Nations has successfully gained International support to begin manning a United Nations Legion to carry out all phases of the peace building: preventive action, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement.¹ (see definitions in Appendix A). By 2020, after experiencing a glut of peacekeeping missions turned violent, the International community finally came to the realization that between the Strategic Goal of International Peace, and the Tactical employment of troops, there was no tie to bind the two. Relying upon ad hoc mustering of forces from a thrown together coalition was not only slow, it hampered the situation by placing men and equipment in harms way without the benefit of tried and true working relationships.

In 1992, then Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali published his *Agenda for Peace*. In it he called for the formation of a United Nations military force. He declared “the ready availability of armed forces on call could serve, in itself, as a means of deterring breaches of the peace since potential aggressors would know that the council had at its disposal a means of response ... [and he] recommend[ed] the Security Council initiate negotiations in accordance with Article 43”² (see Appendix B)

After nearly 25 years of domestic and international bickering, enough support was gained to carry Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s concept to fruition. A force structure, complete with administrative, logistical and training support was formed and the UN

¹The new Secretary General Kofi Annan, has recently decided to rename the activity called “preventive diplomacy” as “preventive action,” as reported by the United Nations home page at <http://www.un.org/>

²Boutros-Ghali, p. 25.

Legion carried out its first mission in the year 2015. The UNGACOT is the Legions tenth mission.

A need for change

Back in the present time, recent operations indicate a need for synergy and timeliness:

- *Somalia*: Originally a 500-soldier Pakistani battalion was sent in. A report by the US Government Accounting Office quoted a UN official as concluding that by the time the Pakistani battalion arrived on scene, the situation had deteriorated to the point where no less than 3,000 troops were needed to simply stabilize the situation. It took two more months for President Bush to order the dispatch of 28,000 troops.
- *Cambodia*: Late deployments, and poor logistical support scuttled plans to disarm the warring factions before elections. Twelve infantry battalions from 32 participating nations were supposed to deploy to the area by June 1992; only 5 arrived in theater by the deadline. It took an additional six weeks for all units to be deployed, and even then support and quality of troops bedeviled portions of the force.
- *The Balkans*: A NATO study estimated that 25,000-40,000 troops were required to establish and secure five safe havens. In May 1993, the force commander estimated that UNPROFOR would require an additional 34,000 troops more than those already present (approximately 12,000 were in country). However, the Secretary General and Security Council chose to authorize only 7,600, and by the end of the year they had not yet arrived.
- *Rwanda*: In 1994 the United States held the operation hostage until firm plans had been established for committing the 5,500 troops mandated for the operation. The

result was an unconscionable delay which caused great loss of life and deterioration of field conditions.³

These examples indicate that the international community in general, and the United Nations in particular, are ill-prepared for responding to violent confrontation between neighboring factions. The current pattern is for the UN Security Council to pass a resolution calling for a cease-fire and authorizing an international coalition of military units to forcibly, if necessary, persuade the two belligerents into an accord. The United States responds by calling upon the appropriate CINC to either come up with a force structure and a plan in support of a solution, or to support the lead nation in a similar fashion. Once a cease-fire is in place, a UN peacekeeping mission will arrive in country to keep the two at bay.




figure 1




figure 2

The number of peacekeeping operations have grown significantly in recent history. As indicated by figures 1 through 5, the United Nations is finding itself on the upswing of peacekeeping operations.⁴ There are currently 16 missions going on throughout the world, and there have been 26 missions completed, see Appendix C and D. Since the end of the Cold War, the calls for United Nations assistance to help resolve conflicts have increased dramatically. Previously quiet areas erupted in the sound of gunfire, and nations

³Carl Conetta, and Charles Knight. *Vital Force A Proposal for the Overhaul of the UN Peace Operations Systems and for the Creation of a UN Legion*, pp. 71-73.

⁴Barbara Crossette, "U.N. Chief Chides Security Council on Military Missions." *New York Times*, 6 Jan. 1995.

are finding themselves torn apart. There little reason to imagine this trend will reverse itself in the near future.




figure 3




figure 4




figure 5

If the number of operations is increasing, then it is only a matter of time before a future UN peacekeeping mission will re-live the experiences of Somalia. “If the disarmament of the population becomes an objective, then there should be no mistaking the fact that the troops given this mission have committed to combat.”⁵ However, currently there is no mechanism to provide immediate relieve to beleaguered troops. Kjell Skjelsbaek, the Director of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, sums up the limitations associated with the peacekeeping process: “First, they cannot by themselves stop warfare. ... Second, peacekeeping is but one step on the road toward a lasting

⁵Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, p. 90..

settlement, a resolution of a given conflict.”⁶ It is this ‘lasting settlement,’ and how to achieve it, with which the operational commander must concern himself.

The Missing Link

Operational Art is many things to many people. The simplest way of thinking about Operational Art is to see it as the process of meeting the demands of National or International leadership, while providing the troops in the foxholes (or aboard ships) with the necessary tools and training to get the job done. Joint Publication 3-0 goes on to explain it further:

Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and effective joint and multinational cooperation. Operational art is practiced not only by JFCs but also by their senior staff officers and subordinate commanders. Joint operational art looks not only at the employment of military forces but also at the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. Joint operational art, in particular, focuses on the fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronization of air, land, sea, space and special operations forces.

Among many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions:

- ⇒ What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (**Ends**)
- ⇒ What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (**Ways**)
- ⇒ How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (**Means**)
- ⇒ What is the like cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of action?⁷ (**Cost benefit**)

⁶Kjell Skjelsbaek, “UN Peacekeeping: Expectations, Limitations and Results: Forty Years of Mixed Experience.” *The United Nations and Peacekeeping*, p. 53.

⁷Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, p III-3.

Juxtaposing this notion of Operational Art with the goal of the United Nations, you would come up with the follow for a given scenario of acts of aggression within a region:

Ends: Peace and stability has been restored to the region. Unfortunately for the operational commander attempting to restore this peace and stability, a UN resolution is the last place to look for guidance. "By their inherent nature, Security Council resolutions are at best a compromise. They are often couched in language that may be interpreted in various ways, resulting in difficulties, especially for commanders in the field who must translate diplomatic language into precise orders."⁸

Ways: For the operational commander, there are several options available:

- A large nation unilaterally enters into the conflict and restores peace, forcibly, if necessary; an option which may not be considered viable in many parts of the world.
- A regional alliance comes in to put a stop to the destabilizing violence being committed by on against their neighbors; this would be ideal, but this also depends upon the region of the world and the relative balance of power in the region.
- An ad hoc international coalition led by a larger state forms to arrive in theater and force the parties to a solution. A proven success in the Gulf War, but this option is heavily dependent upon time and politics.
- An already formed, trained and rapidly deployable unit of United Nations armed forces arrive in country with region expertise .

Means: Using the US planning process as an example, the means would be established using either pre-approved plans or through some sort of crisis action planning. For unilateral or regional alliance action, this should be a fairly straight forward evolution. However, for an ad hoc coalition, "...[a] degree of uncertainty regarding overall force

⁸Indar Jit Rikhye, *The Future of Peacekeeping*, p. 8.

quality is unavoidable with a rapidly assemble UN force; this adds to operational risk, which is already considerable for early entry forces.”⁹

Attempting to achieve ambiguous ends as set forth in UN resolutions, through the use of a quickly (and haphazardly) organized coalition of international forces, is not the most logical or most efficient use of the world’s treasure. “If it takes more than 10 seconds to explain the command arrangements, they probably won’t work.”¹⁰ Perhaps the missing link between the Ends and the Ways is a UN Legion made up of volunteers from throughout the world. “If the goal is a truly rapid multilateral capability to deploy for peace operations, there is no good substitute for a UN standing force.”¹¹

Planning for Operations

The scope of Joint Operation Planning includes five activities: mobilization planning, deployment planning, employment planning, sustainment planning, and redeployment planning.¹² A UN Legion based out of UN headquarters in New York city could establish a staff sufficient for this sort of planning.

The planning process would begin by establishing several new Divisions at the United Nations Department of Peace Operations (DPO):

- Office of Budget and Management; provides oversight of fiscal planning.
- The Joint and Combined Operations Division (JCOD): acts as the home base for all UN-directed peace operations. This division would be divided into two separate yet interacting offices: the Office of Field Operations (which would be further divided into regional experts), and the Office of Field Support. Both would be responsible for

⁹Conetta, and Knight, p. xiii.

¹⁰Allard, p. 92.

¹¹Conetta, p. xiii.

¹²Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, p. I-3.

the planning, logistics and operations; the former being the 'line office,' the latter being the logistics office.

- Office of Information and Research: provides the intelligence and expertise. It would, like the Office of Field Operations, be divided in to regions. It would also have a situation room.¹³

Mobilization planning would start with the Office of Field Operations gaining access to bases throughout the world for pre-positioning of the Legion's resources, both men and equipment. The Office of Field Operations would be responsible for structuring the organization to ensure the world's hot spots have the largest contingencies within a few days reach.

Deployment planning again begins in the JCOD. It specifically falls on the Office of Field Support, but would require coordination with the Office of Field Operations to determine the field requirements for various regions and various contingency plans. The Office of Field Support would coordinate with UN member states to have use of the necessary ships for moving men and equipment from their pre-positioned bases to the conflict area. (The force structure could include some heavy-lift air transports , either An-124 or C-5 Galaxy).¹⁴

Employment planning falls upon the regional experts within the Office of Field Operations. A Deliberate planning process would be established, with various plans developed and reviewed periodically to ensure their timeliness. Also, a Crisis action planning process would be put in place, referring to the Secretary General in determining the final courses of action to carried out.

Employment planning would have to include a contingency for withdrawal if the conflict turns to all out war. UN member states and regional security alliances would need

¹³Conetta, and Knight, p. xii.

¹⁴Theodore L. Gaillard, Jr., "Giving the UN Some Teeth," Armed Forces Journal International, November 1995, pp. 21-22.

to be briefed on this contingency to ensure that when a conflict does arise, they are remaining alert to the situation and are preparing to provide the necessary forces to restore peace.

Sustainment planning would be done by the Office of Field Support. Once again, a heavy reliance upon UN member states would be required to ensure the lines of communication will remain open, and may even require some logistical support from member states in or near the conflict region. The force structure would be designed such that there were three levels of field support: field logistics base, intermediate support units, and tactical level units. The tactical unit would be organic to the field force, while the other two levels would have limited mobility.¹⁵

The Redeployment planning would include a transition over to a lightly armed peacekeeping force, very similar to the ones in use at present time. This planning would be done in close coordination with the DPO to ensure its units are sufficiently trained on the specifics of the conflict.

Operational Art (synergy et al)

Operational Art is characterized by (partly): synergy, balance, timing and tempo and arranging operations,¹⁶ see Appendix E for full definitions and other characterizations. These factors play right into the notion of a UN Legion which can be placed at the disposal of the Secretary General, when directed by the Security Council. As shown on page 4 and 5 of this report, there have been several failed attempts to restore stability and security to regions due to the lack of synergy and timing.

¹⁵Conetta, and Knight, p. 98.

¹⁶Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, pp. xi-xii.

In September 1995, the Canadian government submitted a report entitled Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations; it came about as an outreach of the 1994 Canadian Foreign Policy which stated:

The end of the Cold War has liberated the U.N. Security Council from the superpower confrontation, has raised public expectations and has opened up new opportunities for the U.N. with respect to international peace and security. At the same time it has presented the U.N. with new and unprecedented challenges, including a wave of humanitarian and peacekeeping emergencies, for which it is ill-equipped ... *If the U.N. is to live up to its potential, more will have to be done to give it the effective structures, the political guidance and the resources it now lacks.*¹⁷ (emphasis added).

In its concluding chapter, the report provides 26 recommendations an *examination of the establishment of a standing civilian police capability, and political and technical examination of a small U.N. Standing Emergency Group.*¹⁸

To further indicate the operational potential of such a concept, a United Nations independent study group presented its vision:

To provide states and people with security from violence and disorder, the present improvised approaches will be made much more systematic. The separate functions of an enhanced U.N. system - peacekeeping and conflict-resolution, human rights, social and economic development, peace-building - will be better integrated to achieve "human security" for all peoples. The Security Council will have been enhanced by a more representative structure and by willingness of governments and by the willingness of governments to contribute regularly to the effectiveness of the U.N. security operations. The veto power will have been modified, at least to the extent of the Permanent Members agreeing to limitations on its application. *By next century ... the United Nations will ... have a capacity for rapid deployment immediately upon the decision of the Security Council.* (emphasis added)¹⁹

¹⁷Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations, Sept. 1995, p. 65.

¹⁸Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations, Sept. 1995, pp. 65-71.

¹⁹The United Nations in its Second Half-Century, pp. 7-8.

It is this type of visionary outlook which provides sufficient justification for proceeding with standing up a military arm to the United Nations.

Conclusion

In order to accomplish UN peace operations, a method must be devised to achieve operational success. A trained and knowledgeable staff must perform the in-depth planning processes; a logistical support system must be developed to provide the necessary equipment when it is needed; a working chain-of-command needs to be already in place to provide continuity and synergy of effort; and the men and women in the field need to be properly trained. The current ad hoc process of coalition building is proving to be less of a solution and more of a hindrance.

One tool to successfully carry out UN resolutions could be the formation of a UN Legion. Its members would be volunteers from all the UN member nations, and its support structure would be based out of UN headquarters. With pre-positioned supplies, this force could rapidly deploy to regions of instability and provide a timely response for a timely solution.

During the 1950s, the late Walter Lippman, founder of *New Republic* and Pulitzer Prize winner, wrote in his *New York Times* column "that the UN peacekeeping operations from their inception were founded upon a new, bold and sublime concept, the concept of the soldier of peace who is sent to an area of conflict not to wage war but to promote peace, not to fight enemies but to help friends."²⁰ Perhaps it is time for operational commanders world wide to realize the genius of this concept and help in designing the tool to get the job done.

²⁰F.T. Liu, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Management and Operations*, p. 3.

Appendix A:

Definitions

Peacemaking: “The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that end disputes and resolve the issues that led to conflict. Military activities that support peacemaking include military-to-military relations and security assistance operations. Other military activities, such as exercises and peacetime deployments, may enhance the diplomatic process by demonstrating the engagement of the United States abroad.”^a

Peacekeeping: “There is no universally accepted definition ... Peacekeeping, as defined by this publications [JP 3-07.3] is:

‘Military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.’ ...

A more comprehensive definition was developed by the International Peace Academy, ... which states:

‘Peacekeeping is the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.’^b

Peace enforcement: “The application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions. The purpose of PE is to maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.”^c

^aFM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, p. 2.

^bJP 3-07.3, *JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations*, pp. A-1 & A-2.

^cFM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, p. x.

Appendix B

Charter of the United Nations Selected Articles

CHAPTER VII

ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such

arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.
4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Appendix C^a

CURRENT MISSIONS

AFRICA

1. Angola - UNAVEM III
United Nations Angola Verification Mission III
February 1995 - To present
2. Liberia - UNOMIL
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
September 1993 - To present
3. Western Sahara - MINURSO
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
September 1991 - To present

AMERICAS

4. Haiti - UNSMIH
United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
July 1996 - To present

ASIA

5. India/Pakistan - UNMOGIP
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
January 1949 - To present
6. Tajikistan - UNMOT
United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
December 1994 - To present

EUROPE

7. Bosnia & Herzegovina - UNMIBH
United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
December 1995 - To present

^aSource of this information is the UN home page at <http://www.un.org/>

8.Croatia - UNMOP

United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka

January 1996 - To present

9.Croatia - UNTAES

United Nations Transitional Administration

for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium

January 1996 - To present

10.Cyprus - UNFICYP

United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus

March 1964 - To present

11.Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - UNPREDEP

United Nations Preventive Deployment Force

March 1995 - To present

12.Georgia - UNOMIG

United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia

August 1993 - To present

MIDDLE EAST

13.Golan Heights - UNDOF

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

June 1974 - To present

14.Iraq/Kuwait - UNIKOM

United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission

April 1991 - To present

15.Lebanon - UNIFIL

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

March 1978 - To present

16.Middle East - UNTSO

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

June 1948 - To present

Appendix D^b:

COMPLETED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

AFRICA

1. ANGOLA - UNAVEM I
United Nations Angola Verification Mission I
January 1989 - June 1991
2. ANGOLA - UNAVEM II
United Nations Angola Verification Mission II
June 1991 - February 1995
3. CHAD/LIBYA - UNASOG
United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group
May 1994 - June 1994
4. CONGO - ONUC
United Nations Operation in the Congo
July 1960 - June 1964
5. MOZAMBIQUE - ONUMOZ
United Nations Operation in Mozambique
December 1992 - December 1994
6. NAMIBIA - UNTAG
United Nations Transition Assistance Group
April 1989 - March 1990
7. RWANDA - UNAMIR
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
October 1993 - March 1996
8. SOMALIA - UNOSOM I
United Nations Operation in Somalia I
April 1992 - March 1993
9. SOMALIA - UNOSOM II
United Nations Operation in Somalia II
March 1993 - March 1995

^bSource of this information is the UN home page at <http://www.un.org/>

10. RWANDA/UGANDA - UNOMUR
United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
June 1993 - September 1994

AMERICAS

11. CENTRAL AMERICA - ONUCA
United Nations Observer Group in Central America
November 1989 - January 1992

12. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC - DOMREP
Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic
May 1965 - October 1966

13. EL SALVADOR - ONUSAL
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
July 1991 - April 1995

14. HAITI - UNMIH
United Nations Mission in Haiti
September 1993 - June 1996

ASIA

15. AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN - UNGOMAP
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
April 1988 - March 1990

16. CAMBODIA - UNAMIC
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
October 1991 - March 1992

17. CAMBODIA - UNTAC
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
March 1992 - September 1993

18. INDIA/PAKISTAN - UNIPOM
United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission
September 1965 - March 1966

19. WEST NEW GUINEA - UNSF

United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian)
October 1962 - April 1963

EUROPE

20. CROATIA - UNCRO

United Nations Confidence Restoration Organization in Croatia
March 1995 - 15 January 1996

21. FORMER YUGOSLAVIA - UNPROFOR

United Nations Protection Force
March 1992 - December 1995

MIDEAST

22. IRAN/IRAQ - UNIIMOG

United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
August 1988 - February 1991

23. LEBANON - UNOGIL

United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon
June 1958 - December 1958

24. MIDDLE EAST - UNEF I

First United Nations Emergency Force
November 1956 - June 1967

25. MIDDLE EAST - UNEF II

Second United Nations Emergency Force
October 1973 - July 1979

26. YEMEN - UNYOM

United Nations Yemen Observation Mission
July 1963 - September 1964

Appendix E

Operational Art	
Synergy	Integrate and synchronize operations in a manner that applies force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents.
Simultaneity and Depth	Bring force to bear on the opponents entire structure in a near simultaneous manner to overwhelm and cripple enemy capabilities and the enemy's will to resist.
Anticipation	Remain alert for the unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation.
Balance	Refers to the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the joint force, as well as the nature of timing of operations conducted to disrupt an enemy's balance.
Leverage	Gain, maintain, and exploit advantages in combat power across all dimensions.
Timing and Tempo	Conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the enemy.
Operational Reach and Approach	Basing, whether from overseas locations, sea-based platforms, or the continental United States, directly affects operational reach. In particular, advance bases underwrite the progressive ability of the joint force to shield its components from enemy action and deliver symmetric and asymmetric blows with increasing power and ferocity.
Forces and Functions	Campaigns and operations can focus on defeating either enemy forces or functions, or a combination of both.
Arranging Operations	The best arrangement will often be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to achieve the desired end state conditions quickly and at the least cost in personnel and other resources.

Appendix E

Operational Art	
Centers of Gravity	The essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effects against the enemy's sources of power in order to destroy or neutralize them.
Direct versus Indirect Approach	To the extent possible, JFCs attack enemy centers of gravity directly. Where direct attack means attacking into an opponent's strength, seek an indirect approach.
Decisive Points	(Usually geographic in nature) Correctly identifying and controlling decisive points can gain a marked advantage over the enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an action.
Culmination's	Synchronization of logistics with combat operations can forestall culmination and help commanders control the tempo of their operations.
Termination	Before forces are committed, JFCs must know how the NCA intends to terminate the operation and ensure its outcomes endures.

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